Researchers at Technische Universität Berlin have shown that the lockout meant to stop repeated guessing of Windows Hello and BitLocker PINs can be reset by someone who opens a PC, cutting the worst-case time to crack a short PIN from years to days.
The problem sits with firmware TPMs. Unlike a separate TPM chip, a firmware TPM built into the processor has no secure storage of its own, so it stores its saved state, including the count of wrong guesses, encrypted on the mainboard's flash chip. If an attacker can restore an old copy of that state, the count goes back too. Newer PCs try to prevent that rollback with Replay Protected Monotonic Counters, or RPMC, inside the flash chip, which are supposed to only move upward.
The team found two ways around that protection. On AMD PCs that use RPMC counters, AMD's processor firmware never verifies that a counter actually increased. A small interposer board placed between the processor and the flash chip can block the update while reporting success, so the PC accepts the old state. In Winbond RPMC flash chips, a brief drop in the power supply, known as a voltage glitch, can make the chip reveal the secret key that signs its counter values in about a second at the researchers' best settings. With that key, an attacker can forge counter values.
In the lab, the researchers attacked a locked HP OmniBook 3 with an AMD Ryzen AI 5 330 processor. Their setup typed PINs starting from 1000 and found the four-digit Windows Hello PIN, 1235, after 236 tries in 57 minutes. From the measured speed, they calculate a worst case of about 40 hours for a four-digit Hello PIN, compared with 69 days if the documented lockout worked. The second test used a Framework Laptop 13 with an Intel Core Ultra 5 125H processor and Winbond flash. It found the six-digit BitLocker PIN, 123457, after 236 tries in 6 minutes and 55 seconds. For a default six-digit BitLocker PIN, the calculated worst case falls from 19 years to 20 days.
AMD confirmed the firmware flaw in a security bulletin published on November 17. It tracks the issue as CVE-2026-43613, with a CVSS score of 5.1, and describes it as insufficient authentication of RPMC increment completion in its Secure Processor firmware. AMD says attacks requiring physical access fall outside its product security threat model, but adds that RPMC is intended to stop this type of interposer attack. It plans firmware mitigations from November 2026 through February 2027 across Ryzen, Ryzen AI, Ryzen Threadripper, Athlon and EPYC lines, and advises owners to maintain physical control of systems and watch for signs of tampering until updates arrive. Intel said the research did not demonstrate a vulnerability in an Intel component, which matches the test, where the attack on the Intel laptop relied on the Winbond chip.
The researchers say they told AMD about the flaw in February and Microsoft in April. They have published their attack firmware, board designs and scripts, while stressing that reproducing the RPMC attacks is not plug-and-play and requires their custom board. Neither the research paper nor the vendor notices describe attacks outside the lab.
For owners and administrators, the immediate defence is a longer PIN. The researchers advise adding at least two digits to Hello and BitLocker PINs. In their figures, an eight-digit PIN raises the worst case to 46 years for the Hello attack and 6 years for the BitLocker attack, even with the lockout bypassed.